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RULE 10B-5(B) ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN
LIGHT OF JANUS: MAKING THE CASE
FOR AGENCY DEFERENCE
Matthew P. Wynne*
This Note addresses whether the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders applies to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and, if not, whether the SEC’s
own interpretation of Rule 10b-5 should be entitled to deference in future
SEC enforcement actions. Since its promulgation in 1942, Rule 10b-5 has
been the subject of much debate, particularly regarding the scope of the
private right of action that courts have interpreted the rule to imply.
Having acknowledged that an implied right exists, the Supreme Court
quickly began to limit Rule 10b-5 claims of private plaintiffs, citing concern
over expanding a right of action not grounded in a statute or regulation. In
contrast, the Court has instructed lower courts to construe Rule 10b-5 “not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes” when dealing with SEC cases. In Janus—the latest curtailment
of the private Rule 10b-5 action—the Court held that a defendant must have
ultimate authority over a statement to make a misstatement with it that
violates Rule 10b-5(b). Among other justifications, the Court reemphasized
its concern over expanding the implied private right of action without
congressional authorization. Today, confusion abounds in the lower courts
about whether the Court’s narrow interpretation applies to all Rule 10b-5
actions (including those brought by the SEC) or merely to private civil suits
(as in Janus).
This Note contends that the underlying rationale for the Court’s Janus
decision is not applicable to SEC enforcement actions. While the Court’s
decision may fit the particular circumstances of Janus, the policy
considerations cited by the Court do not apply to the SEC, and, therefore,
the Court’s narrow interpretation of Rule 10b-5 should not apply to actions
brought by the SEC. Assuming Janus does not apply, this Note contends
that the SEC’s pre-Janus interpretation would withstand Chevron-style
analysis of an agency interpretation and is therefore entitled to substantial
judicial deference in future enforcement actions.
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.B.A., 2008, University of
Notre Dame. I would like to thank Caitlin, my family, and my friends for their
encouragement and support throughout this process. I am also grateful to my advisor,
Professor Clare Huntington, for her advice and guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
“To make,” or not “to make”: that is the question.1 Although
Shakespeare surely did not contemplate the complexity of federal securities
laws or mutual fund structures when he wrote his famous line, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently attempted to answer a pressing question for actors
in the capital markets: What does it take “to make” a materially misleading
statement such that one is primarily liable for a violation of Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5(b)?2
Imagine that a mutual fund advisor creates a fund for investors who own
the fund entirely.3 The advisor, under a management agreement with the
fund, controls the day-to-day operations of the fund. All the officers of the
fund are employees of the advisor. As a separate legal entity, the fund has a
board of directors, all of whom are independent from the advisor except for
one. The advisor, being in the best position to do so, provides all the
information for the fund’s prospectus, chiefly, that the fund is not suitable
for market timing trading strategies. Separately, and unbeknownst to the
fund’s board, the advisor has entered into secret arrangements with third
parties to permit market timing in the fund. Having no reason to suspect
inaccuracies in the advisor’s information, the board approves the
prospectus. The advisor then distributes the prospectus to potential
investors. A state regulator uncovers the misstatement, causing the fund’s
investors to flee. With the loss of assets under management, the fees
collected by the advisor (and ultimately its publicly traded parent) plummet.
The stock price of the parent drops. Shareholders of the parent company
sue the advisor for the misstatement. Can the advisor be primarily liable for
making those misstatements in the fund’s prospectus? Would the answer
change if the SEC were the plaintiff instead of a private party?
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivate Traders,4 a private
securities lawsuit, the Supreme Court addressed the first question but failed
to answer the second. The Court severely curtailed the scope of Rule 10b5(b), holding that one must have “ultimate authority” over a statement in

1. Apologies to William Shakespeare. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc.
1 (“To be, or not to be: that is the question.”).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2012). For the full text of the rule, see infra text
accompanying note 22.
3. This hypothetical is based, at a high level, on the facts of Janus Capital Group, Inc.
v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). For a more complete description of
Janus, see infra Part I.A.3.a.
4. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).

2114

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

order “to make” a material misstatement with it.5 The advisor in the above
hypothetical, Janus Capital Management (JCM), did not have “ultimate
authority,” and thus could not be primarily liable.6 The fund and its board
lacked the requisite scienter for primary liability.7 As a result, no party was
held liable for the misstatement that caused the plaintiff’s loss.
The Court, however, did not clearly articulate the reach of its holding.
Because the facts and procedural stance of Janus are unique, lower courts
have struggled to determine when the ultimate authority test applies and to
whom it applies to. Specifically, courts are wrestling over whether Janus
applies to SEC enforcement actions—indeed, the SEC itself is unsure.8
In Janus, the Court rejected the SEC’s position, set forth in an amicus
brief, which argued for a broader interpretation of Rule 10b-5.9
Nonetheless, the Court did not explicitly state that the holding applied to
SEC enforcement actions, and language in the opinion indicates it may not.
Since the Janus decision, the SEC has generally avoided the question and
pursued enforcement actions against defendants lacking “ultimate
authority” either by charging them with aiding and abetting the primary
actor’s 10b-5(b) violation10 or by pursuing other provisions imposing
liability.11 Although this strategy has been somewhat effective, the
secondary liability approach only works if there is a separate primary
violator to aid and abet.
In the face of the Court’s limitation on private securities litigation, many
simply assumed that Janus applied to all Rule 10b-5 cases. Justice Thomas
went to great lengths, however—both before and after stating the Court’s
holding—to explain that the private right of action must be construed
narrowly because it was implied in the statute. Although the facts,
procedural stance, and policy reasons identified in Janus may have
rightfully compelled the Court’s decision, such a limitation on Rule 10b-5
should not sweep so broadly as to incorporate cases where these facts and

5. Id. at 2302.
6. Id. at 2302, 2304.
7. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. See Yin Wilczek, Extent to Which Janus Applies to SEC Actions Not Clear, Official
Says, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 462 (March 5, 2012) (according to SEC Deputy
Solicitor John Avery, “It is ‘not clear’ whether the decision covers SEC actions.”).
9. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303–04 & n.8.
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)
(“[A]ny person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another
person in violation of a provision of this chapter . . . shall be deemed to be in violation of
such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.”).
11. For example, see SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., No.6:09-cv-1963-Orl28GJK, 2012 WL 3264512 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012), which was in progress when the Janus
decision was handed down. The SEC withdrew its primary liability claims against some
defendants under Rule 10b-5 and added claims that the defendants instead aided and abetted
other primary violators. Id. at *2; see also Jean Eaglesham, At SEC, Strategy Changes
Course, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2011, at C1; Yin Wilczek, SEC Looking to Aiding/Abetting
Claims in Wake of Janus Decision, Official Says, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 457 (March
5, 2012).
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policy considerations are not present. Specifically, Janus should not apply
to SEC enforcement actions.
This Note will argue that the Janus decision is limited to private
securities litigation and does not apply to Rule 10b-5(b) SEC enforcement
actions. Additionally, the SEC’s interpretation of the Rule, arguing for a
“creation” standard, is reasonable. Since the Court’s 1945 decision in
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,12 the Court has given an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation “controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous.”13 While the Court has refined the “Seminole Rock deference”
standard over the years, it has reaffirmed the underlying principle in recent
Therefore, courts should defer to the SEC’s reasonable
cases.14
interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) in future SEC enforcement actions.
Part I of this Note will first provide a background discussion of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the
SEC’s enforcement authority. Next, Part I will provide background on the
history of private actions under Rule 10b-5, ending with a discussion of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus. Last, it will discuss the
background of agency deference in general and as it applies to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation.
Part II will first discuss whether Janus applies to the SEC, reviewing the
Janus decision itself as well as subsequent lower court decisions. Part II
will then discuss whether the SEC’s interpretation should be entitled to
judicial deference if Janus does not apply. This will include a discussion of
the competing interpretations of Rule 10b-5 expressed in pre-Janus cases,
the Janus majority, the Janus dissent, and the SEC’s amicus brief in Janus.
Part III will argue that Janus was indeed limited to private actions and
does not apply in SEC enforcement actions. Finally, it will argue that the
SEC’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) is reasonable and a permissible
construction of the Rule, satisfying the concerns expressed by the Janus
court while allowing the SEC to carry out its essential task of protecting
investors. Therefore, the SEC’s interpretation should be entitled to
substantial deference from courts in future enforcement actions.
I. THE BEGINNINGS: SECURITIES LAWS AND AGENCY DEFERENCE
This part provides a brief history of the securities laws and regulations
underlying the Janus case, as well as an overview of the bedrock principles
of agency deference found in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Part I.A
briefly surveys the circumstances leading to the federalization of securities
laws, the relevant securities laws and regulations, and the SEC’s authority

12. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
13. Id. at 414.
14. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504 (1994). See generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole
Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449 (2011) (surveying the current scope of
Seminole Rock deference).
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to enforce them. Part I.A concludes with a brief history of the private right
of action under Rule 10b-5, up to and including the Janus case.
Part II.B then lays out the oft-cited Chevron analysis, which courts apply
to determine when to defer to a federal administrative agency’s
interpretation of a statute. Part II.B then describes an analogous line of
cases defining Seminole Rock deference, which dictates when a court
should defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. Finally
Part II.B concludes by introducing the potential interaction of agency
deference with stare decisis.
A. History of Relevant Securities Laws
This section describes the development of federal securities laws, the
history of SEC Rule 10b-5, and the SEC’s enforcement authority. It then
provides a brief history of the Rule 10b-5 private action and concludes with
a discussion of the Janus case.
1. History of SEC Rule 10b-5
The history of federal securities law begins with the bull market of the
1920s and the subsequent Great Depression, which was caused in part by
the dramatic stock market crash of 1929.15 At the time, only a patchwork
of state “blue sky laws” regulated the market for securities.16 Seizing on
the moral and ethical failings of Wall Street at the time, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt used his New Deal platform to push for the restoration of
investor confidence in the financial markets.17 In 1933, Congress passed
the Securities Act18 (’33 Act), and, in the following year, the Securities
Exchange Act19 (’34 Act), federalizing the regulation of securities.20 The
combined purpose of the Acts was to prevent fraud and create full
disclosure to allow investors to make informed decisions.21
15. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 407–08 (1990) (describing the process leading to enactment of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
16. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 1.2[2] (6th ed. 2009).
17. Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 65–66
(2009).
18. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77zzz (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). The Securities Act requires issuers to
register securities offerings with the SEC and to disclose material information in a securities
registration statement and prospectus. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 2.0.
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). See generally 1 LOUIS LOSS,
JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 57–60 (6th
ed. 2011) (providing an overview of the Acts).
20. See Colombo, supra note 17, at 65.
21. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984) (“[The Acts] had and still have two
basic components: a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of disclosure when
securities are issued periodically thereafter.”); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
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Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any
securities-based swap agreement . . . any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.22

Although the Acts explicitly listed numerous civil and criminal penalties,
Congress recognized that a rigid statutory framework would impede the
efficient regulation of securities trading.23 As part of the ’34 Act, Congress
created the SEC24 and delegated to it an “arsenal of flexible enforcement
powers,”25 including the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
enforce the provisions of section 10(b).26
In 1942, a company president in Boston was buying shares from his
investors without disclosing to them the latest improved earnings.27 Milton
Freeman, then an Assistant Solicitor at the SEC, was tasked with drafting a
rule that would prohibit such activity. Freeman quickly drafted a rule and
presented it to the Commission the same day. Without any hesitation, the
Commission unanimously approved the rule.28 That rule, SEC Rule 10b-5,
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
U.S. 462 (1977) (“[T]he fundamental purpose of the [’34] Act [is] ‘to substitute a philosophy
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor. . . .’” (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972))). But see Thel, supra note 15, at 388–94
(critiquing the Supreme Court’s conception of section 10(b) and offering an alternative
view).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
23. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d. The ’34 Act transferred to the SEC the administration of the
’33 Act, formerly administered by the Federal Trade Commission. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.1
(2012).
25. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (making it unlawful to act “in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors”).
27. See Milton V. Freeman, Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S1 (1993).
28. See id. at S1–S2; see also Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS.
LAW. 891, 922 (1967) (recounting Commissioner Sumner Pike, the only person to say
anything at the meeting, stating: “Well, we are against fraud, aren’t we?”).
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in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.29

This rule has not changed since 1942. Section 10(b) has been characterized
as a “catchall,”30 and Rule 10b-5, similarly, as “a sort of long-arm provision
in which the SEC forbids everything the statute gives it power to forbid.”31
The language of Rule 10b-5 has also been praised as open-ended and
adaptable, allowing a degree of flexibility to reach new schemes and
tactics.32
2. SEC Enforcement Authority
The SEC consists of five Commissioners, appointed by the President,
who collectively oversee five separate divisions, including a Division of
Enforcement.33 Section 21 of the ’34 Act authorizes the SEC to enforce the
Acts.34 This authority includes the express power to enforce the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission under the ’34 Act—
specifically, Rule 10b-5.35 In its enforcement role, the SEC is a “statutory
guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the
securities laws.”36 The SEC’s enforcement decisions must balance the
multidimensional nature of the SEC’s mission of protecting investors;
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital
formation.37
The SEC has several options and venues available to carry out its
enforcement duties.38 First, the SEC has the power to bring actions in
federal court to seek temporary and permanent injunctive relief against
possible violators,39 to request that a court prohibit persons from serving as
officers or directors of registered companies,40 to seek civil monetary

29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
30. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is aptly
described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.”).
31. Thel, supra note 15, at 462–63; see Colombo, supra note 17, at 66 (“Rule 10b-5
attempts to circumscribe the widest range of conduct subject to prohibition under § 10(b) by
broadly enjoining any fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”).
32. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 As an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. S19–S21 (1993) (describing the benefits of the ambiguity of Rule 10b-5’s language).
33. See About the SEC: What We Do, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter About the SEC].
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2006).
35. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78–79
(2006); see also Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical
Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 371 (2008) (listing the federal securities laws that the SEC is tasked
with enforcing).
36. SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975).
37. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 35, at 369.
38. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u; 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2012). For a general overview of
available enforcement options, see 1 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 1.4[6].
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1).
40. Id. § 78u(d)(2).
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penalties for securities law violations,41 and to request equitable relief.42
Second, the SEC can bring administrative action against alleged violators.43
In these administrative proceedings, the SEC may impose monetary
penalties after notice and opportunity for a hearing.44 An administrative
law judge (ALJ), who is independent of the SEC, presides over these
hearings.45 The ALJ issues an initial decision, which can be appealed to the
Commission.46 The Commission’s decision can be appealed to federal
circuit courts.47 Third, the SEC can refer cases to the Department of Justice
for criminal prosecution.48
3. A Brief Overview of the Private Right of Action Under Rule 10b-5
The ’34 Act does not explicitly provide for a private right of action under
section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, whereby a private citizen (as opposed to a
government agency) may bring a civil action against a violator in court.49
Nevertheless, soon after the SEC first promulgated the rule, federal district
courts, starting in 1946 with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,50 began
finding an implied private remedy for Rule 10b-5 violations.51 However,
the Supreme Court did not officially recognize this implied right of action
in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 until 1971.52
Following the Court’s recognition, Rule 10b-5 became a popular and
powerful tool for the securities plaintiff’s bar.53 Besides their popularity,
private actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “play a vital role in
protecting the integrity of our securities markets.”54 The combination of
SEC enforcement efforts and private rights of action under federal securities
laws helps to provide a “high level of investor confidence in the integrity
and efficiency of our markets.”55 As an Associate Justice, William H.
41. Id. § 78u(d)(3).
42. Id. § 78u(d)(5).
43. Id. §§ 78u-2, 78d-1 (delegation to ALJ).
44. Id. § 78u-2(a).
45. See About the SEC, supra note 33.
46. See id.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1); see Office of Administrative Law Judges, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/alj.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
48. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 1.4[6].
49. See Colombo, supra note 17, at 67.
50. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
51. Id. at 513–14.
52. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is
now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”).
53. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 16, § 12.3[3], at 528 (“[T]here are hundreds of reported
cases each year involving the rule.”).
54. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 174 (2008).
55. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687 (providing
background for the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995); see also Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (“[W]e repeatedly have
emphasized that implied private actions provide ‘a most effective weapon in the
enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a necessary supplement to Commission action.’”
(citations omitted) (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964))).
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Rehnquist once referred to the Rule as a “judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn.”56
Only four years after recognition of the implied right, however, the Court
began, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,57 to express reservations
about continuing to imply a private right not grounded in any tangible
congressional intent.58 Later, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver,59 the Supreme Court held that private civil liability under
Rule 10b-5 did not extend to those who only aided and abetted the
manipulative practice but did not themselves engage in the violation.60 The
Court held that the implied right of action did not extend beyond the
language of the statute.61
Soon thereafter, fearing that Central Bank might also preclude the SEC
from bringing aiding and abetting charges, Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).62 The PSLRA
explicitly amended the ’34 Act to authorize the SEC to bring actions against
persons who aid and abet securities violations63 but did not include a
provision authorizing private suits for similar conduct.64
In Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta,65 the Court
sought to clarify the now important distinction between primary and
secondary liability. In that case, the defendants, Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola, knowingly falsified contracts with Charter Communications, who
then used those contracts to falsify its own financial statements.66 Charter
was the undisputed primary violator of Rule 10b-5, but the private-party
plaintiffs sought to hold the defendants liable as well.67 The Court
acknowledged that “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive,”68 but the plaintiffs
could not establish reliance, an essential element in a private Rule 10b-5
action, because the defendants’ statements were never actually made to the
plaintiffs.69 Additionally, none of the defendants’ acts made it “necessary
or inevitable” that Charter would fraudulently record the transactions as it

56. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
57. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
58. Id. at 737 (“When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5 . . . it would be
disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the [SEC] in 1942 foreordained the
present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5.”).
59. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
60. Id. at 191.
61. Id. (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold that a
private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”).
62. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 104 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
63. Id. § 104 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006)).
64. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158
(2008); Colombo, supra note 17, at 78.
65. 552 U.S. 148.
66. Id. at 153–55.
67. Id. at 155.
68. Id. at 158.
69. Id. at 159.
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did.70 Lastly, acknowledging judicial creation of the private right of action,
the Court cautioned against its expansion.71
Most recently, the Court further narrowed the scope of private Rule 10b5 actions in Janus. The next section will provide background on mutual
funds relevant to the Janus case.
a. Background on Mutual Funds
The Janus case involved misrepresentations in the prospectus of a mutual
fund. This section will provide a brief background on mutual funds, their
structure, how they are managed, and how they are regulated. The next
section will cover the specific facts of Janus.
A mutual fund, in general, is a legal entity that pools money from
investors and invests in a portfolio of securities.72 The fund is created by a
sponsor, which contracts with the fund, often through a subsidiary, to
provide subsequent operational management of the fund.73 The fund is
owned entirely by investors who purchase shares in the fund, with each
share representing proportionate ownership of the fund’s portfolio of
securities.74 As a stand-alone legal entity, mutual funds have their own
board of directors, distinct from the sponsor or its subsidiaries.75 The
primary role of the fund’s board of directors is to oversee the delegation of
management to the contracted manager.76 The sponsor or its subsidiary,
through its management contract with the fund, usually provides investment
advisory, brokerage, and custodial services for the fund, among other
things.77 Mutual funds rarely have their own employees and are therefore
externally managed and operated by the sponsor or its subsidiary. This
contractual manager is often referred to as an investment advisor or
management company.78 The management company is typically paid a
percentage of the assets under management held in the fund and does not
share directly in the gains and losses of the fund’s investments.79 To attract
investors, mutual funds issue a prospectus, which details the fund’s
investment strategy, objectives, fees, expenses, risks, and methods for
purchasing or redeeming shares, among other things.80

70. Id. at 161.
71. Id. at 165 (“Concerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution
against expansion. The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us.”).
72. ROBERT C. POZEN, THE MUTUAL FUND BUSINESS 16 (Sandra D. Crane ed., 1998).
73. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1019 (2005).
74. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 17.
75. See id. at 4.
76. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 1020.
77. See id.
78. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 4.
79. See id. at 6; see also Langevoort, supra note 73, at 1020.
80. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 20.
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In addition to the ’33 Act and ’34 Act, mutual funds are subject to
additional federal laws that specifically address investment companies and
their advisors. The Investment Company Act of 194081 requires all funds to
register with the SEC and follow certain operating standards.82 The fund’s
advisor is also subject to the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.83 Lastly,
the ’33 Act requires specific disclosures by the fund, and the ’34 Act sets
out antifraud provisions regarding the purchase and sale of fund shares.84
b. The Facts of Janus
First Derivative Traders, the lead plaintiff in this class-action suit,
represented shareholders of Janus Capital Group (JCG). First Derivative
sued JCG and its wholly owned subsidiary Janus Capital Management
(JCM) for alleged misstatements in the prospectus of Janus Investment
Fund (JIF).85 JCM and JCG, the sponsors, had created JIF, a mutual fund,
as a separate legal entity owned entirely by investors.86 JIF contractually
retained JCM to be its investment advisor, underwriter, and administrator.87
All JIF employees were also officers of JCM, but only one member of JIF’s
board was associated with JCM.88
Seeking to attract investors, JIF issued prospectuses that detailed the
investment strategy and operation of its mutual funds.89 The prospectuses
for several funds stated that the mutual funds were not suitable for market
timing trading strategies.90 Shortly thereafter, the New York Attorney
General filed a complaint against JCG and JCM, alleging that JCG entered
into secret arrangements to permit market timing in certain funds managed
by JCM, contrary to the disclosures in the JIF prospectus.91 Following the
Attorney General’s complaint, JIF fund investors withdrew substantial
amounts of money from JIF.92 JCM earned money from JIF based on JIF’s
assets under management, so the decrease in JIF’s assets reduced JCM’s
advisory revenues, which in turn decreased revenues for JCM’s parent,
JCG.93 First Derivative, a JCG shareholder, alleged that if the truth had
been known about permitting market timing strategies, the Janus mutual
81. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006).
82. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 21.
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21; see Pozen, supra note 72, at 21.
84. See POZEN, supra note 72, at 21.
85. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301–02
(2011).
86. Id. at 2299.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2299–2300.
89. Id. at 2300.
90. Id. Market timing, while not illegal, id., is “an investment strategy by which
sophisticated short-term traders take advantage of delays in the pricing of mutual funds, to
the detriment of other fund investors.” Norman S. Poser, The Supreme Court’s Janus Capital
Case, 44 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 205, 205 (2011).
91. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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funds would have been less attractive to investors, thus reducing the price
of JCG stock that the plaintiffs would have paid to purchase it.94
First Derivative alleged that JCM “caused mutual fund prospectuses to be
issued for Janus mutual funds and made them available to the investing
public, which created the misleading impression that [JCG and JCM] would
implement measures to curb market timing in the Janus [mutual funds].”95
The District of Maryland dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim.96 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that “JCG and
JCM, by participating in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses,
made the misleading statements contained in the documents.”97 The Fourth
Circuit also held that investors could infer that JCM “played a role in
preparing or approving the content of the Janus fund prospectuses.”98
c. The Janus Holding
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether JCM could be
held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements
included in JIF prospectuses.99
The Supreme Court held that, “[f]or purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker
of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the
statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate
it.”100 The board of JIF had final approval of the prospectus. Therefore,
JCM—which had provided substantive information for the fund’s
prospectus, drafted the misstated prospectus, and distributed it—did not
“make” a false statement under Rule 10b-5(b) because the fund, JIF, and
not the advisor, JCM, had “ultimate authority” over the prospectus.101
d. The SEC’s Amicus Brief
The SEC filed an amicus brief102 contending that, for purposes of Rule
10b-5(b), “make” should be defined as “create.”103 The SEC argued that its
position was “controlling” as long as it the interpretation was not “plainly

94. Id. at 2300–01.
95. Id. at 2300.
96. Id. at 2301 (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d, 618, 620 (D. Md.
2007), rev’d, 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)).
97. Id. at 2301 (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009),
rev’d sub nom. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)).
98. Id. (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 127 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d
sub nom. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2302. For a full discussion of the conflicting interpretations of “to make,” see
infra Part II.B.3.
101. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
102. Brief for United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Janus, 131 S. Ct.
2296,(No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4339892 [hereinafter SEC Janus Brief].
103. Id. at 12–17.
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erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”104 The Court was quick to
dismiss the SEC’s position, noting that the Commission was not entitled to
deference where the meaning of the rule was not ambiguous and expressed
skepticism over affording deference to the SEC in a private right of action
to which the SEC was not a party.105 The Janus majority opinion, and its
conflict with the dissenting Justices and SEC, will be discussed in greater
detail in Part II.
B. Agency Deference
Federal administrative agencies are tasked with carrying into effect the
will of congressional statutes.106 Agency duties vary, but generally include
promulgating rules based on such statutes and enforcing both the statutes
and rules.107 This frequently requires the interpretation of imprecise or
unclear statutes and regulations.108 Often, the agency’s interpretation might
be a choice between reasonable alternatives, even where one interpretation
might appear “better” than another to those outside the agency.109
Nonetheless, for decades, courts have shown varying degrees of deference
to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes, rules, and regulations.
This Note will focus on judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulation. However, it is important first to understand the
underlying rationale for agency deference,110 articulated by the Supreme
Court in the seminal case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.111 After discussing the basic principles, this section
will narrow its focus to deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
rule, as laid out first in Seminole Rock112 and more recently reaffirmed in
Auer v. Robbins.113

104. Id. at 13–14 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
105. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 n.8 (“[W]e have previously expressed skepticism over the
degree to which the SEC should receive deference regarding the private right of action. . . .
[T]he SEC’s presumed expertise ‘is of limited value’ when analyzing ‘whether a cause of
action should be implied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particular class of litigants.’
This also is not the first time this Court has disagreed with the SEC’s broad view of § 10(b)
or Rule 10b-5.” (citations omitted)).
106. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
358–60 (2010) (providing an introduction to the federal administrative state).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 703–06 (1991).
110. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 619 (1996) (“Although Seminole
Rock preceded Chevron by almost four decades, the Court in Seminole Rock did not offer
any detailed rationale for binding deference. When the Supreme Court finally supplied a
substantial explanation for Seminole Rock deference, it incorporated Chevron’s more fully
developed premises.”).
111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
112. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
113. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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1. Chevron Deference
Chevron deference is commonly understood to include two “steps.”114
Chevron Step One asks “whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.”115 If Congress’s intent is clear, the inquiry ends
because the court, as well as the agency, must follow the “unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”116 If Congress has not directly addressed the
issue, however, the court does not impose its own construction of the
statute,117 rather, it moves to Chevron Step Two.
If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue, Step Two requires the
court to ask “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”118 To administer the congressional scheme,
agencies must formulate policy and promulgate rules to fill the gaps left by
Congress.119
There are two types of delegation gaps: explicit and implicit.120 Certain
statutes may be explicit (e.g., “The SEC shall define X”) or implicit (e.g.,
“The SEC shall have the authority to make regulations to enforce this
provision”). With an express delegation, agency interpretations are given
controlling weight unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.”121 With an implicit delegation, a court may not
substitute its own construction for a reasonable interpretation made by the
agency.122
While the Chevron analysis has remained consistent, a question
eventually arose as to when this analysis should apply. The Court
attempted to answer that question in United States v. Mead Corp.123 The
Court’s answer has been referred to as “Chevron Step Zero.”124
In Mead, the Court noted that there were times when Congress did not
intend to delegate authority to an agency to fill a gap.125 In those cases,
Chevron deference would not apply, and a court should instead consider
114. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (providing a detailed overview of the scope of Chevron deference
leading up to United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001), which was decided shortly after
the article’s publication).
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
116. Id. at 842–43.
117. Id. at 844.
118. Id. at 843.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 843–44.
121. Id. at 844; see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–706 (2006).
122. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not
disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S.
374, 382, 383 (1961))).
123. 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (“We granted certiorari . . . in order to consider the limits
of Chevron deference owed to administrative practice in applying a statute.”).
124. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
125. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–39.
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applying a less deferential form of “Skidmore126 deference,” a pre-Chevron
standard.127 The court should only apply Chevron deference when
Congress expresses intent to delegate rulemaking authority, either explicitly
or implicitly.128 A good indicator of such intent is “express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”129 The
Court noted that such formalized procedures “foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement” with the force of law.130
Thus, Chevron Step Zero requires judicial review of the process that
yielded the agency interpretation demanding deference before proceeding
through the traditional Chevron two-step analysis.131
2. Chevron’s Cousin: Seminole Rock Deference for an Agency’s
Interpretation of Its Own Regulation
The Supreme Court has long recognized strong judicial deference toward
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. This form of deference—
developed separately from the Chevron line of cases—is commonly
referred to as Seminole Rock deference.132 In Seminole Rock, the Court
held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation “becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”133
Despite the different lines of cases, there are substantial parallels between
the two doctrines.134 Both are grounded in a form of implied delegation.135
Both provide for “mandatory” deference in that an agency’s interpretation is
controlling, so long as it is a permissible construction.136 Accordingly,

126. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
127. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228, 235.
128. Id. at 229.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 230 (“Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication.”).
131. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986
(2005) (“Chevron established a familiar two-step procedure for evaluating whether an
agency’s interpretation of a statute is lawful.”).
132. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114, at 899.
133. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). See generally
Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The Deference
Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587 (1984).
134. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114, at 899; see also Manning, supra note 110,
at 627.
135. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114, at 899.
136. See id.; see also Manning, supra note 110, at 627.
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Seminole Rock deference has been referred to as the “cousin” of Chevron
Step Two.137
There are three primary justifications for Seminole Rock deference. First,
the Court has highlighted concerns for political accountability in such
decisions, because they often entail policy judgments.138 Second, the
agency’s relative expertise favors binding deference to agency
interpretations of regulations.139 Third (and distinct from Chevron), the
agency has unique and “superior competence to understand and explain its
own regulatory text.”140 The agency is in a better position to use its
historical familiarity with the reasons for adopting the text to reconstruct the
purpose of the regulation.141
Over the years, the doctrine has been refined but remains largely intact.
An agency’s construction of its own regulation is entitled to substantial
deference, so long as the interpretation “sensibly conforms to the purpose
and wording of the regulations.”142 An agency’s interpretation need not be
the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards.143 A
Court’s task is not to pick the interpretation that best serves the regulatory
purpose;144 rather, a court must defer to the agency’s interpretation unless
an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by
other indicators of the agency’s intent at the time the regulation was
promulgated.145 Agencies are free to write regulations as broadly as they
137. See Victor L. Prial & Michael Kruse, Administrative Law, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV.
637, 637–38 (2008) (calling Seminole Rock deference “Chevron’s less widely known
cousin”); see also John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 59 (2003)
(“Although this formulation differs in words, it seems in practice to be indistinguishable
from Chevron’s step two.”).
138. See Manning, supra note 110, at 629; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (citing Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697
(1991)) (noting that deference is “all the more warranted” where the agency action requires
judgment grounded in policy concerns); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (referencing an agency’s unique policymaking
prerogatives).
139. See Manning, supra note 110, at 629–30; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S.
at 512 (“This broad deference is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation
concerns ‘a complex and highly technical regulatory program’ . . . .” (quoting Pauley v.
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)); Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (“[A]pplying an
agency regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique
expertise . . . .”).
140. See Manning, supra note 110, at 630; see also Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (“[W]e
presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”).
141. See Manning, supra note 110, at 630; see also United States v. Cleveland Indians
Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220 (2001) (“We need not decide whether the [informal]
Revenue Rulings themselves are entitled to deference . . . . [T]he Rulings simply reflect the
agency’s longstanding interpretation of its own regulations.”).
142. Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N. Ind. Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Porter Cnty. Chapter of Izaak Walton League, Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975)).
143. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991).
144. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512.
145. Id.
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wish, so long as they conform to the boundaries of the statute; therefore, a
rule of statutory interpretation that required an agency to construe its
regulations narrowly “would make little sense.”146 Furthermore, agency
interpretations put forth in amicus briefs can represent the agency’s fair and
considered judgment.147 The Supreme Court has also suggested that an
agency’s interpretations should receive even greater deference when the
statute combines rulemaking and enforcement powers in one agency.148
At times, the Court has limited when such deference should be accorded.
In Mead, the Court required a more formalized process in order to receive
Chevron deference.149 Mead may apply to Seminole Rock deference in that
a court would require evidence of a formalized process for agency
interpretations before deferring to the agency.150
The combination of Seminole Rock deference and the interpretive rule
exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking has led to a line of
restrictions on the doctrine known as an “antiplaceholder principle.”151 In
general, courts are wary of an agency’s ability to quickly promulgate vague
regulations that receive little objection in notice-and-comment periods and
then implement their true policy through subsequent interpretations.152
Along those lines, courts have warned that they will not defer to an
agency interpretation when the underlying rule is so vague as to be
meaningless or, in other words, when an agency “promulgate[s] mush.”153
Furthermore, the Court held in Gonzales v. Oregon154 that it would not treat
an interpretive rule as an interpretation of the regulation if the regulation is
merely “parroting” statutory language.155 Instead, courts will treat it as an
informal interpretation of the statue, which requires only Skidmore
deference under Mead.156 This “antiparroting” principle may only be
designed, however, to prevent intentionally vague regulations that an
agency may interpret as it sees fit later and then demand deference for such

146. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1997).
147. Id. at 462 (“There is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation [in an amicus
brief filed by the agency] does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment . . . .”).
148. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151–55
(1991) (comparing the SEC’s unitary structure to the split structure set up under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act and analyzing the different Congressional purposes for
doing so).
149. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
150. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1450–52.
151. See id. at 1467–72.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1467 (citing Mission Grp. Kan., Inc. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 781–83 (10th
Cir. 1998); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584, 588 (D.C. Cir.
1997)).
154. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
155. Id. at 257.
156. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 14, at 1467–68.
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interpretation.157 This was a major concern for the dissenting Justices in
Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala158 and Mead.159
How do the two lines of cases fit together then? A regulation “must be
consistent with the statute it implements”160 and cannot be interpreted more
broadly than the statute itself.161 Thus, for an interpretation to receive
Seminole Rock deference, a court must first determine if the agency
regulation violates the statute, a straightforward Chevron question.162 Only
then will Seminole Rock apply and determine whether the agency’s
interpretation is consistent with the regulation.163
3. Reconciling Agency Deference with Stare Decisis
Principles of agency deference, like those espoused in Chevron and
Seminole Rock, are formal, interpretive guidelines backed by substantial
judicial authority.164 Courts often interpret statutes or rules and create
precedent, however, when no agency is involved. When a court interprets a
statute or rule, it declares to Congress and the public, “[T]his is what a
statute means,” and this is what it will most likely mean in the future,
barring a convincing need for change.165 In later cases, courts will
generally adhere to this precedent and apply it to the case before them,
following the principle known as stare decisis.166 The obligation to follow
precedent recognizes that no judicial system could function properly if it
approached each issue or case as one of first impression.167 Conversely, the
outer limit of stare decisis is marked by the recognition that prior decisions
can be clear errors and, if so, should no longer be followed.168 Thus, “stare
decisis is not an inexorable command.”169 Rather, when a court examines a
prior holding, “its judgment is customarily informed by a series of
prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge
157. See id.
158. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
159. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Agencies will now have high incentive to rush out barebones, ambiguous rules construing
statutory ambiguities, which they can then in turn further clarify through informal rulings
entitled to judicial respect.”).
160. See Manning, supra note 110, at 627 n.78.
161. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (“[D]espite the
broad view of . . . Rule [10b-5] advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot
exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b).”).
162. See Manning, supra note 110, at 627 n.78.
163. See id.
164. See Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis “Exception” to the Chevron
Deference Rule, 44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 725 (1992).
165. See id. at 746–47.
166. See id. at 744; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare
Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2237 (1997).
167. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
168. Id.
169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”170 Like
Chevron and Seminole Rock deference, stare decisis is a judicially crafted
decision-making tool.171 Part II.B.2 discusses what happens when these
two principles collide.172
II. THE TRANSITION: THE POST-JANUS CONFLICT
Now that the stage has been set, Part II of this Note will describe the
conflict in the post-Janus realm of securities law. First, does the Janus
holding apply to an SEC Rule 10b-5 enforcement action? Second, if it does
not apply, should the SEC’s alternative interpretation of “to make” be
entitled to judicial deference in a future enforcement action?
A. Does Janus Apply to SEC Enforcement Proceedings?
The Janus Court did not specifically address whether its decision applied
to all Rule 10b-5 actions, including SEC enforcement cases, or whether it
was limited to the narrower class of private actions. Some courts have
applied Janus in subsequent SEC actions. Conversely, others have
expressed doubt about its application to SEC actions, and some have
expressly stated it does not apply to SEC actions. This section describes the
post-Janus landscape where lower federal courts struggle to decide: does
Janus apply to SEC enforcement proceedings?
1. The Janus Opinion
The Janus Court itself did not specifically address the scope of its
holding. Some language in the opinion appears to apply to Rule 10b-5 in
general, which may be evidence of a broader application for all parties
bringing a Rule 10b-5 action. The wording of the holding, “[f]or purposes
of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate
authority over the statement,”173 seems to apply generally to Rule 10b-5,
without consideration of the factual circumstances of its use. The
majority’s detailed grammar exercise174 is specific to the text of Rule 10b-

170. Id. at 854–55 (“Thus, for example, [the Court] may ask whether the rule has proven
to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind
of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add
inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as
to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.” (citations omitted)).
171. See White, supra note 164, at 747.
172. For a complete discussion on the collision of Chevron and stare decisis, see
generally Pierce, supra note 166, and White, supra note 164. While these articles discuss
primarily Chevron deference, the principles, conflicts, and possible solutions are applicable
to Seminole Rock deference.
173. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
174. See infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
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5, focusing on the definition of “make” as used in the context of the rule.175
Additionally, the Court declined to consider the SEC’s amicus brief in part
because the meaning of the rule was not ambiguous.176 The Court also
expressed concerns for disregarding the corporate form, noting that JCM
and JIF were two separate legal entities.177 Last, the Court expressed
concerns over blurring the line between primary and secondary liability
because private litigants could pursue the former but not the latter.178
Alternatively, the Janus Court’s opinion provides several indications that
the holding is limited to private rights of action. First, the Court was asked
to decide the scope of liability in a private action under 10b-5.179 Second,
the Court cited concerns—both before and after its holding—over
expanding an implied right of action; thus, the Court felt obligated to
construe the statute and rule narrowly. After reaffirming the existence of
the private action under Rule 10b-5, but before stating its holding, the Court
noted:
“[C]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution
against its expansion.” Thus, in analyzing whether JCM “made” the
statements for purposes of Rule 10b-5, we are mindful that we must give
“narrow dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize
when it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the
law.”180

After explaining its holding, the Court once again asserted its desire to
limit the scope of the implied private action: “Our holding also accords
with the narrow scope that we must give the implied private right of action.

175. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“The phrase at issue in Rule 10b-5, ‘[t]o make any . . .
statement,’ is thus the approximate equivalent of ‘to state.’”); see also Elisse B. Walter, SEC
Comm’r, Remarks Before the FINRA Institute at Wharton Certified Regulatory &
Compliance Professional Program (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov
/news/speech/2011/spch110811ebw.htm (“In its recent Janus decision, the Supreme Court
focused simply on the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which of course apply to
the Commission actions as well as private actions. This . . . may have the unfortunate and
ironic result of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.”).
176. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 n.8; see Part II.B.1.
177. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (“We decline this invitation to disregard the corporate
form. Although First Derivative and its amici persuasively argue that investment advisers
exercise significant influence over their client funds . . . it is undisputed that the corporate
formalities were observed.”). The Court also noted that if “control” were to form the basis
of liability, Congress provided a separate provision, section 20(a) of the ’34 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (2006), for “[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable”
for violations of securities laws. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (quoting section 20(a)).
178. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302, n.6 (“[F]or Central Bank to have any meaning, there must
be some distinction between those who are primarily liable (and thus may be pursued in
private suits) and those who are secondarily liable (and thus may not be pursued in private
suits).”).
179. Id. at 2301 (“We granted certiorari to address whether JCM can be held liable in a
private action under Rule 10b-5 . . . .” (emphasis added)).
180. Id. at 2301–02 (citations omitted) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165, 167 (2008)).
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. . . [For the private right of action], we will not expand liability beyond the
person or entity that ultimately has authority over a false statement.”181
Beyond disagreeing with the “ultimate authority” rule announced by the
majority, the dissent expressed concern for the consequences of applying
this rule to the SEC going forward.182 Although the dissent did not offer its
opinion on the scope of the holding, it hypothesized that, if the majority’s
rule applied to the SEC, it would hamper the SEC’s ability to pursue
secondary liability under sections 20(a) (control person liability) and 20(e)
(aiding and abetting).183 Such secondary liability claims would fail because
secondary liability requires a primary violator, and under the majority’s
rule, none existed.184
Notably, neither the majority nor dissent mentioned that the SEC indeed
brought an enforcement action against JCM, which was settled.185 The
SEC’s complaint did not invoke Rule 10b-5 but brought claims instead
under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and Investment Company Act
of 1940.186

181. Id. at 2303 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 167 (2008)).
182. See id. at 2310 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
183. Id. (“[U]nder the majority’s rule it seems unlikely that the SEC itself in such
circumstances could exercise the authority Congress has granted it to pursue primary
violators who ‘make’ false statements or the authority that Congress has specifically
provided to prosecute aiders and abettors to securities violations. . . . That is because the
managers, not having ‘ma[d]e’ the statement, would not be liable as principals and there
would be no other primary violator they might have tried to ‘aid’ or ‘abet.’” (alternation in
original)).
184. Id.; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 n.2 (2010) (“Liability
under § 20(a) is obviously derivative of liability under some other provision of the Exchange
Act.”); SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 566 (2d Cir. 2009) (prosecution for aiding and
abetting requires “substantial assistance” of a primary violation). The dissent also postulated
a hypothetical based on JCM duping the JIF board to make the misstatement:
What is to happen when guilty management writes a prospectus (for the board) containing
materially false statements and fools both board and public into believing they are true?
Apparently under the majority’s rule, in such circumstances no one could be found to have
‘ma[d]e’ a materially false statement—even though under common law the managers would
likely have been guilty or liable . . . for doing so as principals (and not as aiders and
abettors).
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alternations in original); see Andrew
Power, The Thirteenth Stroke: An Approach to “Ultimate Authority” After Janus, 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1297, 1324 (2012); Colin Talia, Note, Janus Capital Group: How
“Making” a Statement Leads to Insulation from Liability, 38 J. CORP. L. 197, 210–16 (2012)
(noting that the Janus decision might encourage companies to create corporate formalities to
avoid liability and recommending possible legislative solutions).
185. See In re Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC, SEC Release No. 2277, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26532, 83 SEC Docket 17666, 2004 WL 1845502 (Aug. 18, 2004); Janus
Capital Management Agrees to Pay $100 Million to Settle SEC Fraud Charges for
Undisclosed Market Timing Agreements, SEC News Digest, 2004-159 (Aug. 18, 2004),
2004 WL 1842517, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/dig081804.txt.
186. See In re Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC., SEC Release No. 2277, 2004 WL 1842517, at
*1.
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2. Lower Courts Since Janus
Since the Janus decision, district courts have struggled to define the
boundaries of the case’s reach.187 Some have applied Janus to SEC
enforcement actions; others have refused to expand the holding beyond the
private right of action.
a. Janus Does Apply to the SEC
The broadest application of Janus appears to be SEC v. Kelly,188 in which
the Southern District of New York not only applied Janus to an SEC Rule
10b-5(b) enforcement action,189 but also extended the “ultimate authority”
principle to sections (a) and (c) of the Rule 10b-5, as well as section 17(a)
of the ’33 Act.190 These later sections address fraudulent schemes and
deceptive practices but lack the operative phrase “to make” found in Rule
10b-5(b).191
In SEC v. Das,192 the District of Nebraska applied the Janus “ultimate
authority” standard where defendants, CFOs who signed and certified the
fraudulent statements, were clearly the “makers” of such statements.193 In
another case, the Southern District of New York denied a motion to
dismiss, finding that, even if Janus applied, the SEC had provided strong
evidence that the defendant was the “maker” of the statements, thereby
satisfying Janus.194 Shortly after the Janus decision, an ALJ applied Janus
to an SEC enforcement proceeding over the objections of the SEC.195
Some commentators agree that Janus applies to SEC enforcement
actions. One commentator reasoned that the Court’s decision is based on
the text of Rule 10b-5, not merely policy considerations.196 Others have

187. See generally Edward B. Micheletti et al., Federal Court Application of Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2432 (Dec. 5,
2011) (discussing the early cases applying Janus and demonstrating their inconsistency).
188. 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
189. Id. at 343.
190. See id. at 344–45.
191. See id.
192. No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011)
193. Id. at *6 (noting that the defendants “were the persons with ultimate authority and
control over the content of the statements and whether and how they were communicated”).
194. SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Assuming arguendo
that Janus’s holding applies to SEC enforcement actions, it does not require that the SEC’s
claim against [the defendant] under Rule 10b-5 be dismissed . . . .”).
195. In re Flannery, SEC Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *34–35 (Oct. 28, 2011)
(citing Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340) (initial decision).
196. See Bryan P. King, The Effects of an Undefined “Ultimate Authority” Standard for
Rule 10b-5 Claims: Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 16 N.C. BANKING
INST. 405, 430 (2012) (“[T]he Court did not provide one definition of the word ‘make’ for
private actions, and a separate definition for SEC actions.”).
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noted that the SEC itself has conceded the point in certain cases197 and has
failed in others to challenge the assertion198 that Janus does indeed apply.
b. Janus Does Not Apply to the SEC
In contrast to the decisions discussed in the previous section, some
district courts have refused to apply Janus to SEC enforcement actions and
beyond Rule 10b-5(b). In SEC v. Pentagon Capital Management PLC,199
the Southern District of New York highlighted the difference between
Janus (a private suit) and the case before it (an SEC enforcement action).200
Private Rule 10b-5 suits require a narrow holding because they are implied
in the statute, unlike SEC actions.201 The court highlighted the Janus
Court’s emphasis on the need to narrow the scope of implied rights of
action.202 Due to this important difference, “[t]here is no indication that the
Court or Congress intended for actions brought by the SEC to be so
limited.”203 In SEC v. Stoker,204 the Southern District of New York refused
to apply Janus to an SEC enforcement action when the concerns over the
implied right of action were not present.205 Last, several district courts
have disagreed with Kelly’s expansion of Janus beyond Rule 10b-5(b),
observing that Janus turned in part on interpreting “to make;” therefore, the
scope of Janus’ holding could not include other antifraud misstatement
provisions that lack this phrase.206
197. See Norman S. Poser, Janus Revisited: The Lower Courts Wrestle with a Troubling
Supreme Court Decision, 44 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 211, 215 (2012).
198. Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative
Securities Jurisprudence 5 (Georgetown Pub. Law. & Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 12019, 2012) (citing Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2010745. In certain cases where the court did not conclude that Janus applies, but
nonetheless found that the defendant had the requisite “ultimate authority” if such a standard
were to apply, the SEC in subsequent motions or appeals has not pushed the court to
definitively apply or reject Janus’s applicability to enforcement actions. See, e.g., Page Proof
Brief of the SEC, Appellee at 33, SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, No. 12-1680-cv (2d
Cir. Nov. 9, 2012), 2012 WL 5829091 (“Because the record supports the district court’s
finding that Defendants had the requisite ‘ultimate authority’ over the implied
misrepresentations, this Court need not consider the alternative holding that Janus does not
apply to Commission actions.”).
199. 844 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
200. Id. at 421–22; see also SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1963Orl-28GJK, 2012 WL 3264512, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) (“Janus . . . emphasized the
difference between private actions and those brought by the SEC. . . . [U]nlike Janus, this
case was brought by the SEC rather than a private party.”).
201. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
202. Id. (citing Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302,
2303 (2011)).
203. Id.
204. 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
205. See id. at 465–66.
206. See SEC v. Sells, No. C 11-4941 CW, 2012 WL 3242551, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10,
2012) (holding that Janus did not apply sections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5); SEC v. Big
Apple Consulting USA, Inc. No. 6:09-cv-1963-Orl-28GJK, 2012 WL 3264512, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) (refusing to apply Janus to section 17(a) of the ’33 Act, and noting that
“the analysis in Janus closely focused on the ‘to make’ language in Rule 10b-5); Stoker, 865
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3. Other Distinguishing Features
Courts often apply different standards to SEC Rule 10b-5 enforcement
actions than they do to private actions for reasons going beyond the specific
text of Rule 10b-5(b) at issue in Janus. First, a private Rule 10b-5 plaintiff
must establish more elements of a defendant’s violation compared to what
the SEC must establish (e.g., the SEC need not prove reliance, economic
loss, or loss causation).207 Second, the heightened pleading standards of the
PSLRA208 may not be applicable to the SEC.209 Different requirements,
such as not needing to prove reliance, allow the SEC to charge primary
liability even when the statements in question are not attributed in public to
the defendant.210 Similarly, courts may apply somewhat relaxed standards
to SEC enforcement actions, despite claims based on the same statutory
language, even in post-Janus cases.211

F. Supp. 2d at 465 (refusing to apply Janus to section17(a) because “by means of” language
of section 17(a) covers a broader range of activity than “to make” and the Janus Court
emphasized the word “make”); Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 422
(refusing to apply Janus to Rule 10b-5(a) & (c) because those sections “utilize[] different
and broader operative language” than Rule 10b-5(b)); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No.
5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“Janus may not
be extended to statutes lacking the very language that Janus construed.”); SEC v. Daifotis,
No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (holding that
Janus does not apply to SEC claims brought pursuant to section 17(a), stating that
“[i]mportantly, the word ‘make,’ which was the very thing the Supreme Court was
interpreting in Janus, is absent from the operative language of Section 17(a)”).
207. Compare Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008) (“In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”), with SEC v.
Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999) (Noting that, to prove a violation
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC must establish that the defendant “(1) made a
material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he had a duty to speak, or used
a fraudulent device; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.”).
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006). “The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to state with
particularity both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing
scienter . . . .” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
209. See Sells, 2012 WL 3242551, at *8 (“[T]he SEC [is not] subject to the heightened
pleading standard required by the PSLRA.”); Pentagon Capital Mgmt., 612 F. Supp 2d at
263–64; SEC v. Dunn, 587 F. Supp. 2d. 486, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (not applying to the
SEC). But see SEC v. Boling, Civ. A. No. 06-1329(RMC), 2007 WL 2059744, at *4 n.1
(D.D.C. July 13, 2007) (applying PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard to the SEC).
210. See SEC v. KPMG, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 374–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“It is
unnecessary, however, to decide whether primary liability could be imposed on the
[defendants] on this basis in a private securities action. The SEC, unlike a private plaintiff,
is not required to prove reliance when it brings enforcement actions under the securities
laws. Accordingly, in an SEC enforcement action, there appears to be no reason to impose a
requirement that a misstatement have been publicly attributed to a defendant for liability to
attach, at least so long as the SEC is able to show that the defendant was sufficiently
responsible for the statement—in effect, caused the statement to be made—and knew or had
reason to know that the statement would be disseminated to investors.” (citations omitted)).
211. See Poser, supra note 197, at 215.
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B. Is the SEC’s Interpretation Entitled to Judicial Deference?
Assuming Janus does not apply to SEC enforcement actions, should the
SEC’s “creation” standard be entitled to deference in future enforcement
actions? This section takes the debate through a Chevron/Seminole Rock
agency deference analysis. First, it will analyze the congressional intent to
delegate rulemaking and interpretative authority to the SEC, a
Mead/Chevron Step Zero question. Next, it will discuss competing views
on whether the Supreme Court has spoken directly to application of the
Janus standard to the SEC, a Chevron Step One analysis. Finally, this
section will analyze the competing interpretations of Rule 10b-5 found in
pre-Janus case law, as well as Janus itself, including the majority opinion,
dissenting opinion, and the SEC’s position. This analysis assesses the
reasonableness of the varying interpretations for purposes of Chevron Step
Two.
1. Mead/Chevron Step Zero
Under Mead, the first step of the interpretive analysis is to ask whether
there is evidence of congressional intent to delegate rulemaking
authority.212 The Mead Court listed several strong indicators of such intent,
including “express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of
rulemaking or adjudication.”213 In our inquiry, the question is whether
Congress intended to delegate such authority to SEC interpretations (i.e.,
has the SEC’s interpretive process for Rule 10b-5 demonstrated the
necessary “fairness and deliberation” to command Chevron style
analysis?).214 Opponents could argue that the interpretations were not made
through notice-and-comment rulemaking and are exactly the type of
interpretations against which the dissenting justices in Mead and Thomas
Jefferson University cautioned.215 In contrast, the SEC could argue that
Congress specifically tasked it with authority to engage in rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudications, which necessarily require interpretation.216
Therefore, Congress surely must have intended for the SEC to interpret its
own rules in exercise of the delegated enforcement and adjudicatory
powers. In addition, the Court stated in Auer that an agency’s amicus brief
reflected the agency’s fair and considered judgment and should be entitled
to deference.217

212. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part I.A.2.
217. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (“There is simply no reason to suspect
that the interpretation [in an amicus brief filed by the agency] does not reflect the agency’s
fair and considered judgment.”).
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2. Chevron Step One: Did Congress or the Court Speak
Directly to this Issue?
Chevron Step One requires the court to ask whether Congress or the
Supreme Court spoke directly to this issue.218 The Step One analysis
requires a few additional inquiries, however, because the question at hand is
dealing with an agency’s interpretation of a rule, which is itself an
interpretation of a statute.219 A court should ask first whether the rule being
interpreted is a practical construction of the statute.220 If the rule is indeed
a practical construction of the statute, the next question is whether the rule
speaks directly to the definition of “to make.”221 If not, the final Step One
question is whether the Court has spoken directly to the issue (i.e., whether
its interpretation of “to make” in Janus applies to the SEC).222
Rule 10b-5 has been enforced and unchanged since its promulgation in
1942.223 There should be no doubt that Rule 10b-5 is a permissible
construction of section 10(b). Accordingly, the analysis should then turn to
Rule 10b-5 itself.224 Neither the text of section 10(b) nor that of Rule 10b-5
defines “make” or expressly delegates authority to the SEC to define it.225
In any event, the Janus Court ruled on the scope of Rule 10b-5, and
Supreme Court precedent always trumps the deference owed under
Chevron.226 The question then becomes: Is this decision limited to private
actions, creating no precedent for the SEC, or does it apply to all
interpretations of Rule 10b-5—including SEC enforcement actions—
barring an alternative SEC interpretation under the principle of stare
decisis?
Questions arise then about what is precedent.227 Can the holding be
isolated from the dicta? Is it the rule, but not the underlying rationale?228
The interaction of these two doctrines is far from settled, and the Supreme
Court has even acknowledged that confusion abounds.229 It has been
suggested that, to resolve this conflict, the court should first ask whether the
statute or rule has spoken to the precise issue.230 If it has not, then the court
218. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
222. See White, supra note 164, at 758.
223. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 29.
226. See Pierce, supra note 166, at 2226.
227. See White, supra note 164, at 757; see, e.g., Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?,
10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576–97
(1987).
228. See White, supra note 164, at 757–58.
229. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985
(2005) (“There is genuine confusion in the lower courts over the interaction between the
Chevron doctrine and stare decisis principles . . . .”). Unfortunately, the Court did not go on
to provide much clarity on the topic.
230. See White, supra note 164, at 758.
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should ask if a judicial ruling has addressed the precise issue.231 When the
reach of such precedent is not clear, the court should defer to the agency’s
reasonable interpretation of the precedent.232
In our inquiry, after concluding above that neither section 10(b) nor Rule
10b-5 addressed this precise issue, the next question is, did the Janus Court
decide the precise issue: Does the “ultimate authority” holding apply to all
Rule 10b-5 actions? If so, the Court’s interpretation has become a de facto
part of the statute.233 If not, then the Court should proceed to Chevron Step
Two234 (or, with an agency interpretation, a Seminole Rock analysis).
Justice Scalia once wrote, “How clear is clear? It is here [at Chevron Step
One] that future battles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law
will be fought.”235 The following subsections will discuss the debate over
the scope of the Janus decision.
a. Yes: The Court Decided the Scope of Rule 10b-5 for All Parties
If Janus decided the scope of Rule 10b-5 for all parties,236 stare decisis
bars the SEC from pursuing its alternative interpretation.237 An agency
cannot simply reinterpret a rule after a court has determined its meaning.238
When the Court declined to follow the SEC’s position set forth in its
brief, the Court noted that the rule was not ambiguous.239 When lower
courts have found that Janus applies, they have uniformly applied the
“ultimate authority” standard to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5(b) enforcement
claims.240

231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 759.
235. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21. See generally Note, “How Clear Is Clear” in Chevron Step One?,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1687 (2005).
236. See supra Part II.A.
237. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 112 (1989) (“A rule of
law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or incomplete
statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain meaning of a
statute.”); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982–83 (2005) (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously
forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill,
displaces a conflicting agency construction.”).
238. See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc, 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990) (“Once
we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the
doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against
our prior determination of the statute’s meaning.”).
239. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 n.8 (2011)
(“Because we do not find the meaning of ‘make’ in Rule 10b-5 to be ambiguous, we need
not consider the Government’s assertion that we should defer to the SEC’s interpretation of
the word elsewhere.”). But see Langevoort, supra note 32, at S7, S19–S21 (attributing the
effectiveness of Rule 10b-5 over time to its ambiguous language).
240. See supra notes 189–97 and accompanying text.

2013]

MAKING THE CASE FOR AGENCY DEFERENCE

2139

b. No: The Court’s Holding Is Limited to Private Actions
It can be argued that the Court’s holding was limited to private rights of
action and does not apply to SEC actions.241 Although Janus held that the
rule was not ambiguous, merely concluding it is unambiguous does not
make it so. Judge Posner has written that “[a] text is clear if all or most
persons, having the linguistic and cultural competence assumed by the
authors of the text, would agree on its meaning.”242 Applying that logic,
the text of Rule 10b-5 may not be as clear as Justice Thomas concluded.
Indeed, the four dissenting justices disagreed that it was unambiguous.243
Furthermore, several federal courts in pre-Janus cases also held that the
SEC’s interpretation was reasonable.244 While the majority cited two
dictionaries,245 the SEC cited other dictionaries that supported their
interpretation.246 In addition, the majority’s reasoning, which relied on the
text of the rule, was still heavily influenced by policy considerations for
confining private litigation, considerations that are not and should not be
considered in a public SEC enforcement action.247 Therefore, there is no
precedent to which to adhere, a stare decisis challenge would be moot, and
the analysis should proceed to Chevron Step Two.
3. Chevron Step Two/Seminole Rock: Competing Interpretations
of Rule 10b-5(b)
Assuming that Janus does not apply, would the SEC’s interpretation be a
permissible construction of the Rule?
In SEC enforcement actions, the Supreme Court has directed lower
courts to interpret section 10(b) of the ’34 Act “not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.”248 The
statute was designed as a “catch-all”249 to prevent not only “garden type
variet[ies] of fraud” but also “unique form[s] of deception” involving
“[n]ovel or atypical methods.”250 This interpretive principle similarly
applies to Rule 10b-5 actions,251 as the elements of the Rule and the statute
are the same. The question remains: what is the proper interpretation of
Rule 10b-5(b) to apply in an SEC enforcement action?

241. See also supra Part II.A.
242. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 187 (1986).
243. See infra notes 287–94 and accompanying text.
244. See infra Part II.B.3.a.
245. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
246. See infra notes 276–77 and accompanying text.
247. See Langevoort, supra note 198, at 6.
248. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(according Chevron deference to an SEC interpretation of the text of section 10(b) adopted
in a formal adjudication).
249. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
250. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971).
251. VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2011).
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a. Pre-Janus Cases: The SEC’s Creation Standard
The ’34 Act expressly gave the SEC authority to prescribe “rules and
regulations . . . as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors” to enforce section 10(b).252 Shortly thereafter, the
SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5.253 Through its experience with enforcing
Rule 10b-5, the SEC formulated its interpretation of the rule that it applied
when bringing enforcement actions—the creation standard. Rule 10b-5(b)
makes it unlawful for “any person, directly or indirectly” to “make any
untrue statement of material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security.”254 According to the SEC, a person can create a statement
when “the statement is written or spoken by him, or if he provides the false
or misleading information that another person then puts into the statement,
or if he allows the statement to be attributed to him.”255 The SEC has
understood Rule 10b-5 to encompass untrue statements that are created by
someone other than the nominal speaker since 1998, when it first formally
expressed that view in an amicus brief.256 Primary liability will attach
“when a person, acting alone or with others, [with the requisite scienter]
creates a misrepresentation.”257 The SEC adopted this interpretation in a
formal adjudication in 2005258 and has reiterated this view several times
since.259 In SEC v. KPMG,260 a post–Central Bank case, the Southern
District of New York found that an engagement partner at a public
accounting firm could be liable for making misstatements in an audit
opinion, despite not signing the opinion, assuming that he had the requisite
scienter.261 The audit opinion gave “reasonable assurance” that Xerox’s
financial statements were presented in accordance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) when they were not.262 The court held that
252. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see supra notes
22–26 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Part I.A.1.
254. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
255. Brief of the SEC As Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7, Pac. Inv.
Mgmt. Co, LLC v. Mayer Brown, LLP, 603 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1619-cv), 2009
WL 7768584 [hereinafter PIMCO Brief].
256. Brief of the SEC As Amicus Curiae at 17, Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143 & 97-1261
(3d Cir. Apr. 1998) [hereinafter Klein Brief], available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/amicusbriefs.shtml.
257. Id. at 17.
258. In re Armstrong, SEC Release No. 34-51920, 85 SEC Docket 2321, 2005 WL
1498425, at *7 (June 24, 2005) (“A person can be primarily liable under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 for directly or indirectly making an untrue statement of fact if that person, acting
alone or with others, creates a false statement that reaches investors.” (emphasis added)).
259. See SEC Janus Brief, supra note 102; PIMCO Brief, supra note 255.
260. 412 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
261. Id. Rule 10b-5 requires scienter, or “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94, 202 (1975). However, the Court left
open the question “whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.” Id. at 193 n.12.
262. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are uniform minimum standards of, and
guidelines to, financial accounting and reporting. The Financial Accounting Standards
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the partner was “sufficiently responsible for” the opinion and, thus,
primarily liable for “making” the misstatement if all the other elements of
Rule 10b-5 were met.263 Finding that the requisite intent to defraud may be
inferred from recklessness,264 the court applied a recklessness standard for
the scienter requirement and held that mere misapplication of GAAP was
insufficient.265 The court noted that this formulation covered a narrower
scope of conduct than the “substantial participation” test.266
b. The Janus Decision
While the majority opinion in Janus announced the narrow “ultimate
authority” standard for private Rule 10b-5 claims, it is not clear if this
standard also applies to SEC enforcement cases.267 Part III will attempt to
resolve this question.
This section will describe the competing
interpretations found in the Janus majority’s opinion, the SEC’s amicus
brief, and the dissent’s opinion.
i. The Majority Opinion
The majority held that “one ‘makes’ a statement by stating it.”268 The
majority identified five main reasons for its narrow holding. First, the court
looked to the dictionary definition269 of “make.”270 Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court, selected one definition and then engaged in a
Board and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board are authorized by the SEC to
establish these principles. See Frequently Asked Questions, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, http://www.aicpa.org/About/FAQs/Pages/FAQs.aspx (last visited Feb. 15,
2013).
263. KPMG, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 373–75; see SEC v. Power, 525 F. Supp. 2d. 415, 420
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
264. KPMG, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 378–79 (citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 375.
267. See supra Part II.A.
268. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
269. For an analysis and critique of the increased use of dictionaries by the Supreme
Court in statutory interpretation, see James Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage:
The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras (Fordham
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 2195644,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195644. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
recently cautioned against the use dictionaries as a source of statutory meaning. See United
States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043–44 (2012) (citing a variety of sources and
distinguished jurists such as Learned Hand and Frank Easterbrook who have also critiqued
the use of dictionaries).
270. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“When ‘make’ is paired with a noun expressing the action
of a verb, the resulting phrase is ‘approximately equivalent in sense’ to that verb. [6 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 66 (def.59) (1933) (hereinafter OED); accord, WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1485 (def.43) (2d ed. 1934)] (‘Make followed by a noun with
the indefinite article is often nearly equivalent to the verb intransitive corresponding to that
noun’). For instance, ‘to make a proclamation’ is the approximate equivalent of ‘to
proclaim,’ and ‘to make a promise’ approximates ‘to promise.’ [See 6 OED 66 (def.59)]. The
phrase at issue in Rule 10b–5, ‘[t]o make any . . . statement,’ is thus the approximate
equivalent of ‘to state.’”).
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grammatical exercise to explain his interpretation of “to make” (i.e., “one
‘makes’ a statement by stating it”).271 Second, the Court said that the
“ultimate authority” test followed from Central Bank, which prohibited
private actions against those who provided substantial assistance in making
the statement; accordingly, the Court did not want to blur the line between
primary and secondary liability.272 Third, the Court cited Stoneridge,
finding that, without ultimate authority, it would not be “necessary or
inevitable” that any falsehood would be contained in the statement.273
Fourth, the majority “decline[d] the invitation to disregard the corporate
form” and hold JCM liable for misstatements in JIF’s prospectus.274 Fifth,
the Court expressed the need to limit the implied private right of action.275
ii. The SEC’s Amicus Brief
The SEC’s amicus brief in Janus described the history of the SEC’s
creation standard, its grammatical interpretation of “make,” and practical
responses to many of the concerns raised by the Janus majority.276 The
SEC argued that its conclusion—that one can make a statement by “creating
or writing it”—was consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term
“make.”277 Citing a variety of dictionary sources, the SEC laid out what it
maintained to be reasonable grammatical interpretations of “make” as it was
used for purposes of Rule 10b-5.278
The SEC then refuted the speechwriter analogy advanced by the plaintiffs
and accepted by the Court’s majority. The majority stated, “even when a
speech writer drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control of
the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes credit—or
blame—for what is ultimately said.”279 The SEC argued that the analogy

271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2303.
274. Id. at 2304.
275. Id. at 2301–02, 2303.
276. See SEC Janus Brief, supra note 102, at 13–17.
277. See id. at 14.
278. See id. (“[O]ne can ‘make’ a statement by ‘creat[ing]’ or ‘writ[ing]’ it, even if the
statement’s creator is not expressly identified. That conclusion is fully consistent with the
ordinary meaning of the term ‘make.’); see also, e.g., 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1682 (6th ed. 2007) (def. I.1.c, transitive verb: ‘Compose, write as the author
(a book, a poem, verses, etc. [. . .]); draw up (a legal document, esp. one’s will)’; def. I.2,
transitive verb: ‘Cause the material or physical existence of; produce by action, bring about
***; create or take part in the creation of (a sound recording, film, etc.)’); WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1485 (2d ed. 1958) (def. III.17: ‘To cause to exist, appear, or
occur’); see also SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 443 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc) (referring to
‘several common and representative dictionary definitions of “make,” which include “create
[or] cause”; “compose”; and “cause (something) to exist.”); see also Brudney & Baum,
supra note 269, at 68–71 (criticizing the Janus Court’s selective dictionary use and calling it
a “barrier to responsible judicial review.”).
279. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
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was “doubly flawed.”280 First, the analogy refers to making a speech,
which generally refers to an oral delivery by a single person at a specific
point in time, while the JIF prospectuses were written documents
disseminated through a variety of methods over a period of time.281
Second, the prospectus was issued in the name of an artificial person, JIF,
who “can act only through (and at the direction of) others.”282 Thus, “those
who drafted the statements in the document can naturally be described as
their maker.”283
The SEC also argued that an investment adviser exercising day-to-day
management over a mutual fund should be considered a primary, not
Unlike outside consultants, such as lawyers,
secondary, actor.284
accountants, and banks, mutual fund managers are actually responsible for
the issuer’s statements. Nonetheless, if an outside consultant were
“sufficiently involved” in creating or disseminating the statement in the
client’s name, that person may be said to have “made” the statement for
purposes of Rule 10b-5.285 If such an interpretation did not apply to the
conduct at issue, and JCM was not considered a “maker,” the SEC had
grave concerns for its own ability to pursue even secondary liability claims
because there would be no primary violation to aid and abet; thus,
investment advisors who create false statements in their funds prospectuses
would escape liability under section 10(b) altogether.286
iii. The Janus Dissent
The Janus dissent, written by Justice Breyer, expressed similar concerns
as the SEC and chipped away much of the majority’s rationale for the
“ultimate authority” interpretation.
The dissent first addressed the
majority’s grammatical exercise, arguing that the majority incorrectly
interpreted “make” as it was used in Rule 10b-5(b), noting that the scope of

280. See SEC Janus Brief, supra note 102, at 15; see also Browning Jeffries, The
Implications of Janus on the Liability of Issuers in Jurisdictions Rejecting Collective
Scienter, SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 36), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2174604 ([“I]f it is only the speech giver who can be liable in that
scenario, it becomes impossible to impose liability in the frequent circumstance where the
equivalent of the speech giver (e.g., the CFO signing a pubic filing) does not have the
requisite scienter. Using the creator standard, and abandoning the speechwriter analogy,
would enable plaintiffs to hold accountable individual corporate insiders responsible for the
wrongdoing and reflect the corporate reality that it is typically not just one person who has
responsibility for a statement.”).
281. See SEC Janus Brief, supra note 102, at 15. Furthermore, some jurisdictions
applying the “ultimate authority” test have abandoned the analogy. See In re Flannery, SEC
Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at 38 (Oct. 28, 2011) (initial decision) (holding that a
person who gave a presentation was not the one with ultimate authority over the content of
the presentation because he was merely delivering a message created by another).
282. See SEC Janus Brief, supra note 102, at 15.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 17.
285. See id. at 22–23.
286. See id. at 24–25.
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the word is in no way limited to “ultimate authority.”287 In contrast, the
language and previous case law demonstrated that circumstances of the case
determine whether one could make statements contained in a firm’s
prospectus, even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related
responsibility.288 Numerous people can and do make statements.289 The
dissent also challenged the majority’s reliance on Central Bank, noting that
Central Bank did not define primary liability but held merely that the text of
section 10(b) did not provide for secondary liability.290 Unlike Central
Bank, where the defendants did not make any statements, the defendant in
Janus, JCM, did in fact make false statements.291 The dissent also refuted
the majority’s citations to Stoneridge’s “necessary and inevitable” test. The
Stoneridge Court focused on whether investors could have relied on
statements not made to the public. In contrast, the Janus facts show that a
statement was made to the public in the prospectus because of JCM’s
conduct. According to the dissent, the Court’s shift in focus from reliance
to conduct made it difficult to see how Stoneridge supported an “ultimate
authority” test.292 The dissent also expressed concern that there would be
no primary violator if the majority’s opinion were followed, because a
guilty management company, acting through an innocent board that
officially made the statement, would not be liable.293 The dissent called
this liability void the “13th stroke of the new rule’s clock”294 Finally, the
dissent pointed out that corporate officials and others have been held liable
under Rule 10b-5 for having made false statements in documents that they
do not legally control.295 The dissent cited Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston,296 where the Court found that “certain individuals who play a
part in preparing the registration statement” were primarily liable even
where they are not named in the registration statement.297 The dissent also
quoted Central Bank, where the Court found that “a lawyer, accountant, or
bank, who . . . makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
particular purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary
287. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2306 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Neither the common English nor this Court’s earlier cases limit the
scope of that word to those with ‘ultimate authority’ over a statement’s content.”); id. at
2307 (“The English language does not impose upon the word ‘make’ boundaries of the kind
the majority finds determinative. . . . Nothing in the English language prevents one from
saying that several different individuals, separately or together, ‘make’ a statement that each
has a hand in producing.”).
288. See id. at 2306–07 (“Practical matters related to context, including control,
participation, and relevant audience, help determine who ‘makes’ a statement . . . .”).
289. See id. at 2310.
290. See id. at 2307.
291. See id. at 2308.
292. See id. at 2309–11.
293. See id. at 2310.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 2311–12.
296. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
297. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Herman & MacLean,
459 U.S. at 386 n.22).
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violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability
under Rule 10b-5 are met,” including the requisite scienter.298
III. LOOKING FORWARD: “BY JANUS, I THINK NO”299
The Janus decision was limited to private Rule 10b-5 actions and, as
such, does not apply to SEC enforcement actions. As a result, stare decisis
should not block the SEC’s own interpretation. The Janus interpretation of
“to make” may be one permissible construction, but it is not the only one.
The SEC’s creation standard is also a permissible construction of the Rule
and is thereby entitled to substantial deference from courts. The Janus
Court’s concerns for blurring the line between primary and secondary
liability are satisfied because, as demonstrated in SEC v. KPMG, the
creation standard, premised on “sufficient responsibility,” is more exacting
than the “substantial assistance” standard used for of aiding and abetting.
The other policy reasons cited by the Court are not present in SEC
enforcement actions, and, in contrast, there are policy factors in favor of
deferring to the SEC; as a result, the interpretation of Rule 10b-5 need not
be so narrow, and the SEC’s interpretation should be accorded deference
under Seminole Rock.
A. Janus Does Not Apply to SEC 10b-5 Enforcement Actions
The Janus holding was limited to private rights of action and,
accordingly, does not apply to SEC actions. Although the “ultimate
authority” limitation might be necessary in a private suit, the considerations
cited by the Court are not present in an SEC action. First, the Court
explained that it granted certiorari to determine whether, in a private action,
the advisor could be liable for making misstatements.300 Second, if the
proper interpretation merely turned on the dictionary definition of “make,”
then the other rationale for the holding would be superfluous. Instead, it is
the other rationales that drive the selection of the narrow dictionary
definition from a variety of options. For example, the court twice
highlights the need to accord a narrow interpretation to the implied private
right of action.301 This may have been a valid consideration for implied
actions in the face of ever-expanding private securities litigation that
Congress might not have intended.302 There should be no corresponding
concern in SEC actions, however, because they are expressly authorized in
the statute.303 Unlike its private action guidance, the Court has repeatedly

298. See id. (omissions in original) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994)).
299. William Shakespeare, Othello act 1, sc. 2.
300. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
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instructed lower courts in SEC enforcement actions to interpret section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes.304
In addition, the Court expressed concern for blurring the line between
primary and secondary liability because private plaintiffs cannot bring
aiding and abetting suits.305 In contrast, the SEC has express statutory
authority to bring such claims,306 making such concerns unfounded in an
SEC enforcement action.
As the dissent and subsequent commentators point out, the SEC can only
pursue control person liability and aiding and abetting when there is a
primary violation.307 Under the majority’s view, there would be no primary
violator for others to be secondarily liable for aiding and abetting. While
the SEC has other avenues to prosecute fraudulent activity,308 such an
unnecessary limitation would impede the SEC’s ability to carry out its role
in “safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws.”309 If
the “ultimate authority” standard is in fact a “13th stroke” of a clock that
never occurs,310 one must wonder if this could have been what Congress
intended when it passed the ’34 Act and subsequent legislation.
B. The SEC’s Interpretation is Entitled to Judicial Deference
This section will demonstrate why the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5
is entitled to substantial judicial deference. Starting with Mead, then going
through the traditional “Chevron two-step,” the SEC’s interpretation passes
each step set forth in the Court’s jurisprudence. Had the Court considered
the SEC’s interpretation in a separate proceeding that lacked concerns over
implied private rights of action, the analysis would demand deference to the
SEC’s position.
1. Mead/Chevron Step Zero
The ’34 Act expressly delegated rulemaking authority to the SEC but is
silent on the ability to interpret those rules.311 But this authority can surely
be inferred as a function of enforcing such rules and regulations. If the SEC
expresses its interpretation in a formal adjudication, as it did in In re
Armstrong,312 it will pass the initial Mead test. Nonetheless, other
proceedings that “foster . . . fairness and deliberation” could also be
indicators of Congressional intent to delegate “force of law” authority.313
In Auer, the Court stated that an agency’s amicus brief reflected the
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra notes 248–51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61, 272 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11, 35, 186 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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agency’s fair and considered judgment.314 The SEC has set forth its
interpretation in several amicus briefs since 1998.315 Thus, there is no
doubt that the SEC’s process for developing its interpretation passes Step
Zero.
2. Neither Congress nor the Court Spoke Directly to This Issue:
Passing Chevron Step One.
For many of the same reasons expressed in Part III.A, the Janus ruling
should not set precedent for an SEC action, and therefore, neither Congress
nor the Court has spoken to this direct issue. When the reach of the Court’s
holding is not clear, courts should not cut off the analysis,316 particularly
when it considers the policy reasons for agency deference.317
In the present case, Congress has not spoken, so the analysis turns to
whether the Court has spoken to the precise question at issue.318 If not,
then the Court should not impose its own construction.319 In Janus, the
Court did not expressly hold that the ultimate authority rule applies in SEC
enforcement actions,320 so the analysis should proceed to Chevron Step
Two.
3. A Practical Construction: Passing Chevron Step Two
The majority’s interpretation does not have to be the only reasonable
construction. One reasonable construction does not preclude all other
reasonable constructions, especially in the realm of agency interpretations.
The Court itself has stated that an agency’s interpretation need not be the
best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards.321 The Court
has also repeatedly instructed lower courts to interpret section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes.”322 The majority in Janus gave Rule 10b-5 “narrow
dimensions” because of the party bringing the case;323 likewise, one can
infer that there are “broader” interpretations available—but not used—such
as the SEC’s interpretation.
Four Supreme Court Justices, several lower court judges, and several
commentators have also offered alternative, yet reasonable interpretations
of “to make.”324 The dissent argued that the English language does not

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 255–57, 259 and accompanying text.
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115, 231–34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115, 231–34 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.3.b.ii–iii.
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impose limitations such as “ultimate authority” on the word “make.”325
While the majority cited dictionary definitions as support,326 the SEC cited
different dictionary definitions to support its position.327 Surely, the scope
of one of the most important federal securities laws should not turn on
which dictionary one pulls from the library shelf.328 Such disagreement
over the meaning demonstrates that the text of Rule 10b-5 is far from
“clear.”329 When the answer is not clear, the uncertainty should yield to an
agency’s own reasonable interpretation, consistent with Congress’s will to
delegate such authority.
Additionally, the SEC has used the “creation” standard since 1998.330
Courts should not disturb the agency’s “longstanding interpretation of its
own regulations.”331 Nor should a court interpose its own construction
when the SEC’s expertise is more adept at dealing with the complex nature
of mutual fund structures, market transactions, and unique or novel forms of
fraud.332
The cases cited in Part I.B.2, discussing possible limits on Seminole Rock
deference, deal with a court’s ruling on an agency’s action, followed later
by a changed agency interpretation.333 It would be fair to argue that an
agency should not get two bites at the apple or be given the unchecked
power simply to change its interpretation or to overturn a Supreme Court
decision.334 In any event, this would not be the case in a post-Janus SEC
action. The SEC never got a full bite. As an amicus, it offered its opinion,
which the Court was not obligated to follow; the SEC was not a party to the
suit. However, the SEC was never afforded a chance to present its
interpretation insulated from inapplicable policy considerations for limiting
private actions. Were the SEC afforded an opportunity, it could present its
interpretation, and, independent of private actions, a court could decide if
that interpretation was a “practical construction” of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 consistent with Congressional intent.
The only limitation that should be placed on the scope of Rule 10b-5 in
an SEC enforcement action is the text of the statute.335 Unlike Rule 10b-5,
section 10(b) does not include the word “make,” but instead lists “use or
employ.” Such words encompass a broader range of conduct,336 including
that of JCM. Accountants, lawyers, bankers, underwriters, and others who
unknowingly create misleading documents will not be liable if they, as the
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 235, 240–47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140, 250 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149–59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31, 161 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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board of JIF did, lacked the requisite scienter, or intent to deceive.337 It
should be difficult to formulate the policy argument that those who act with
an intent to deceive should be excluded from the scope of Rule 10b-5, as
JCM was. Instead, as proposed by the Janus dissent and consistent with
pre-Janus precedents, a court should undertake a broader inquiry, beyond
“ultimate authority,” into matters of context, control, participation, and
relevant audience to determine who makes a statement for purpose of Rule
10b-5.338
CONCLUSION
The text of Rule 10b-5 has not changed since Milton Freeman wrote it in
1942. In contrast, the securities industry today would be almost
unrecognizable to those from that early period of federal securities law.
Although the industry is evolving every minute, with new products,
markets, fund structures, and means of communication, the text of Rule
10b-5 has, so far, been sufficiently flexible to cover these evolutions.339
The SEC, charged with the monumental task of not only promulgating rules
to keep up with such change but also enforcing those rules to “protect[]
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation,” must be allowed the flexibility to use every possible tool at its
disposal to “effect the remedial purpose” of our nations securities laws.340
That flexibility encompasses the ability to interpret its own regulation in a
reasonable and practical manner designed to keep up with the everchanging market and root out fraud wherever it is found.
After all, “[W]e are against fraud, aren’t we?”341

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

